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RECENT CASES
ARBITRATION AND AWARD-APPAISEMENT-LABon DIsPUTEs.
Plaintiff
and his assignors, employees of the defendant, engaged in a strike to
obtain higher wages, among other things. At the suggestion of the
Department of Labor, the parties agreed to arbitrate, and appointed the
Pacific Northwest Labor Board to settle their differences. They agreed
that plaintiff and his assignors should go back to work, temporarily at
the old wage, and that the decision of the "arbitrators" as to wages
should be retroactive from the time of the decision to the time of returning to work. After the board had determined the wage, which was more
than the old wage, defendant refused to pay plaintiff the increase for
the intermediate period. Plaintiff thereupon brought suit to collect the
difference between the old wage and the wage determind by the Board
for that period. It was admitted that the arbitration did not conform to
the provisions of REms. REV. STAT. § 420 et. seq., providing for the settlement of disputes by arbitration. Held: Plaintiff is entitled to the stipulated increment, as the action of the Board was not arbitration but
appraisement, and, hence, compliance with REm. REV. STAT. § 420 et seq.
is not required. Gord v. F. S. Harmon & Co., 88 Wash. Dec. 93, 61 P. (2d)
1294 (1936).
The Washington court has held that common law arbitration no
longer exists in this state, and that an arbitration, to be valid, must
comply with REM. REV. STAT. § 420 et seq. Dickie Manufacturing Co. 'v.
Sound Construction & Engineering Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916).
Hence, to enforce the decision of the Board, it was necessary to find
that the action of the Board was not arbitration, but appraisal.
Generally, the courts have found it desirable to distinguish between
arbitration and appraisal. The basis of this distinction lies in the fact
that arbitration presupposes a controversy between the parties in a
judicial sense, and seeks to settle that dispute by reference to third
parties without recourse to the courts; whereas an appraisal does not
presuppose a dispute, but simply an indefiniteness in a term of the
contract which it seeks to define, leaving open the question of ultimate
liability. Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 54 L. ed. 891, 30 Sup.
Ct. 615, 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1084 (1910). Thus, if the terms of a contract
at the time of its formation are considered definite by the parties, and
if the parties propose to have any disputes arising from the contract settled by a third party, the situation is one of arbitration. But if a term or
terms of a contract are deliberately left Indefinite, and the parties propose
to have them made definite by the determination of a third party, the
situation is one of appraisal. Flint v. Pearce, 11 R. I. 576 (1877); Martin
v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 168 Pac. 990, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1147 (1917);
Stevenson v. Hazard, 152 Wash. 104, 277 Pac. 450 (1929).
From this factual difference between arbitration and appraisal flow
certain differences in legal attributes, among which are these: At common law the authority of an appraiser, or a clause for appraisal, could
not be revoked without cause, Stevenson v. Hazard, supra; while the
authority of an arbiter, or a clause for arbitration, could be revoked,
California Annual Conference of the M. E. Church v. Seitz, 74 Cal. 287,
15 Pac. 839 (1887). This difference seems to be based on the notion that
arbitration ousted the courts of their jurisdiction, was against public pol-
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icy, and hence should not be enforced, Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445,
22 L. ed. 365 (1874); Heuston, The Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration
(1926) 1 WASH. L. REv. 243; whereas an appraisement, in defining the
terms of the contract, aids the court in that respect, and does not oust
it of its jurisdiction. Church v. Seitz, supra; Flint v. Pearce, supra;
Martin v. Vansant, supra. Since the appraisement does not run afoul of
public policy, its contract feature is given full effect. See 1 WIrusToN,
CoNramcrs § 47. At common law, furthermore, the award of arbitrators
was not binding upon the parties, Heuston, loc. cit. supra; whereas an
appraisement was binding upon them. Wagner v. Peshastin Lumber Co.,
149 Wash. 328, 270 Pac. 1032 (1928). An arbiter, at common law, must
receive and consider evidence offered by the parties. Van Cortan.t v.
Underhill, 17 Johns. 405 (N. Y., 1819); Brown's Exdrs v. Farnandis, 27
Wash. 232, 67 Pac. 574 (1902). But an appraiser can make -his own
investigation, and can use his own knowledge and skill in reaching a
decision. Wagner v. Peshastin Lumber Co., supra. In Washington,
appraisement, being distinct from arbitration, need not comply with
REm. REV. STAT. § 420 et seq., for the statute speaks only of arbitration.
See Washington cases cited, and State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 144
Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927).
In the instant case, the parties entered a contract of labor deliberately
leaving indefinite the wage term. This indefiniteness was to be resolved
by the decision of the Board. Clearly, then, the action of the Board was
appraisement.
K. C. H.
CONTRACTs-INDuCING BBEAcH-PVILEGE.
Two physicians, members
of the King County Medical Society, were engaged in contract practice
as The Associated Physicians' Clinic. Plaintiff was employed by them as
a solicitor. Defendant King County Medical Association enacted a bylaw whereunder members engaged in such contract practice would be
liable to expulsion from the Medical Association. Thereupon, the Medical
Association threatened plaintiff's employers with expulsion from the Association unless they gave up their "contract practice". The employers
chose to give up such practice. Plaintiff brings action against the King
County Medical Association for procuring breach of contract. Defendant
demurred to plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state
a cause of action, and upon plaintiff's refusal to plead further, the action
was dismissed. Judgment affirmed. Held: Considering defendant association as engaged in promoting the interests of its membership, the enforcement of solidarity by threat of expulsion of one of its own members
creates no cause of action for the incidental damage resulting to an
employee of that member who has a contract of employment "for an
unlimited term." Porter v. King County Medical Society, 186 Wash. 410,
58 P. (2d) 367 (1936).
An employee has ordinarily a right of action against a third person
who without legal justification procures his discharge or the termination
or breach of his contract of employment, if damage results to him therefrom. Max v. Kahn, 94 N. J. Law 347, 102 Atl, 737 (1917); Woody 'v.
.Brush, 178 App. Div. 698, 165 N. Y. S. 867 (1917); Carmen v. Fox Film
Corp., 204 App. Div. 776, 198 N. Y. S. 766 (1923); Jones v. Leslie, 61
Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81 (1910). And the fact that the term of service interrupted is not for a fixed period is not a bar to an action against a third per-
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son who has without legal justification procured the termination of his employment. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S .33, 36 Sup. Ct 7, 60 L. ed. 131 (1915);
London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1903); G4bson
v. Fed. and Ca. Co., 232 Ill. 49, 83 N. E. 539 (1907); Jones v. Leslie, 61
Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81 (1910). But legal justification seems to exist
when the discharge is brought about in the exercise of a lawful right,
i. e., in protecting a contract or property right; in interfering to protect
life, reputation, or health; In giving disinterested advice; In case of
disciplinary measures; in refusing to deal; in the course of competition.
CARPENTER, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT RELATIONS (1928); 41 HAav. L.
REV. 728; Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed.
163 (1900); Kemp v. Division 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); Rov.
lier Bros. v. McCauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1891).
On the other
hand, where the discharge is 'brought about by merely malicious motives,
and not in pursuance of a lawful right, the defendant is liable. Jones v.
Leslie, 61 Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81 (1910); Askins, Inc. v. Sparks, 56 S. W.
(2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932); Games 'v. St. Paul Union Stockyards,
164 Minn. 457, 205 N. W. 630 (1925).
In the instant case enforcement of solidarity among the members of
the association, relied upon by the court, gave the defendant a lawful
right to interfere with the plaintiff's contract of employment.
J. L. V.
CRIES-PARDONS-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE. Defendant was found guilty
of a violation of a municipal ordinance. He appealed from the justice
of the peace court to the district court where he was again convicted
and from that judgment was granted an appeal to the Supreme Court.
He later filed a pardon duly executed by the governor of the state. Held:
Under a constitutional provision giving the governor power to grant
pardons for all offenses, the power extends only to offenses for violation
of state laws and not to those which constitute a violation of city ordinances. City of Clovis v. Hamilton, 62 P. (24) 1151 (New Mexico 1936).
The power to pardon, except as limited by constitutions, extends to
every offense against the government known to the law, but is limited to
offenses against the state as such. At common law, and independent
of statutory enactments, punishments for violation of municipal ordinances were treated as civil actions, the imprisonment, after the noncompliance with the orders of the court enforcing the payment of a fine,
being looked upon not In the light of punishment, but as a means of
compelling a compliance with the order of the court and of enforcing
the payment. This Is still the general rule. Floyd v. Eatonton, 14 Ga.
354, 58 Am Dec. 559 (1853); State v. Boneil, 42 La. Ann. 1110, 8 So.
298 (1890); Helena v. Kent, 32 Mont. 279, 80 Pac. 258 (1905).
Hence,
even though considered as quasi criminal, the violation of a municipal
ordinance is not an infraction of a state law. St. Louis v. St. Louis R.
Co., 89 Mo. 44, 1 S. W. 305 (1886); State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 61
N. W. 1023 (1895).
Many offenses against the state are triable in a police court. To
preclude the governor from exercising his power it must appear that
the offense charged was distinctly and solely a violation of a municipal
ordinance. If such offenses are made crimes or misdemeanors by the
general law of the state, the proceedings must be considered as criminal
in their nature. Litchwille v. Hansen, 19 N. D. 672, 124 N. W. 1119
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(1910); Ogden v. Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 78 N. W. 568 (1899); Koo& v.
State, 126 Wis. 470, 106 N. W. 531 (1906). The legislature can give the
governor the power to pardon violations of municipal ordinances, but
the governor has no such power under a constitution granting a general
pardoning power. State v. Alexander, 76 N. C. 231, 22 Am. Rtep. 675
(1877); Allen v. McGuire, 100 Miss. 781, 57 So. 217 (1912); Campion v.
Gillon, 79 Neb. 364, 112 N. W. 585 (1907).
W. G. D.
INJcTIoN-VIoLATIO-MoD
cIcATo0 -CoTmmPT.
Appellant was diverting the entire flow of a stream. An injunction was secured ordering
him to divert only one-half of the flow, allowing the remainder to go its
natural course. The appellant violated this order. Subsequently it was
modified by providing that he could divert the entire flow but must
return one-half to the stream-bed by means of his sluice gate. In contempt proceedings based on the original order, the court held that the
modification changed every rule of conduct prescribed in the first order,
hence there was nothing on which to base the proceedings. Warder V.
Shufeldt, 62 P. (2d) 812 (N. M. 1936).
The general rule is that contempt proceedings will not lie on the
original order after it has been dissolved. Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N. M.
640, 139 Pac. 154 (1914); Taber v. Manhattan iy. Co., 14 Misc. 189, 35
N. Y. S. 465 (1895); Moat v. Holbein, 2 Edw. Ch. 188 (N. Y. 1834); Old
Dominion Telegraph Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220, 37 So. 195 (1904). The
same rule applies when a modification changes every rule of conduct.
Peck v. Yorks, 32 How. Pr. 408 (N. Y. 1867); State v. King, 47 La. Ann.
696, 17 So. 254 (1895); Fremont v. Merced Mining Co., 9 Cal. 19 (1858).
A number of courts have not accepted this general rule, but have held
that a dismissal of an Injunction does not preclude punishment for its
violation while it was in force, on the ground -that it is not for the
defendant to determine whether an injunction Is properly or improperly
Issued. Smith v. Reno, 6 How. Pr. 124 (N. Y. 1851); Wireless SpecialtV
Apparatus Co. v. Priess, 246 Mass. 274, 140 N. E. 793 (1923); Shuler v.
Raton Waterworks Co., 247 Fed. 634 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Crook v. People, 16 Ill. 534 (1855) ; Weidner v. Friedman, 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S. W. 56
(1912).
Washington is in accord with the general rule, Jones v. Jones, 75
Wash. 50, 134 Pac. 528 (1913). A preliminary injunction was Issued in
a divorce proceeding but was not included In the final decree. The
defendant violated the Injunction before the final decree by leaving the
state. The court held that to have binding force the order had to be
carried Into the final judgment.
L. W. S.
MASTER AND SEaVANT-SPECIAL POrICE-INJURY or THIRD PARTY. The
defendant, manager of several restaurants acting under a Los Angeles
ordinance providing for the appointment of special police, procured an
officer to accompany his messenger who nightly collected the receipts
from defendant's establishments. The officer was paid by defendant.
While thus employed, the officer, when alighting from a car, accidentally
dropped ,his shotgun which discharged and injured a pedestrian. Held:
Defendant not liable for the acts of the special police officer since the
officer derives all his power from the appointment by the city authori-
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ties. St. John v. Reid et al, 61 P. (2d) 363 (Cal. App., 1936).
Although the rules of agency here involved are well defined, their
application is made difficult by the factual situation relative to control.
The control of the special police officer emanates from two sources-the
state and the private person or corporation, hereafter called the entrepreneur, whom he is engaged in protecting. Generally the officer is appointed by state authorities at the request of the entrepreneur and discharged by the latter. The method of preventing illegal encroachments
upon property is prescribed by the state. The thing to be protected is
designated by the entrepreneur, who also outlines the method to be
employed by the officer insofar as it is not set forth by the state. In determining liability for the officer's negligent acts this dual relationship
has led to a distinction between the officer when actively and affirmatively engaged as a protector and when acting as a passive or potential
protector. The former situation embraces the actions of the officer in
warding off some illegal attack of violence on the entrepreneur's possessions; the latter, the actions of the officer passively attendant and accompanying the property to be protected, that is, when he is at work
but not actively preventing wrongful intrusion.
As to the entrepreneur's liability when the act complained of Is performed by the officer when actively engaged as a protector, the courts
are in accord holding that the officer is the agent of the state and the
entrepreneur is not liable. Hershey v. O'Neill, 36 Fed. 168 (1888); St.
Louis, . ff. & S. Ry. Co. v. Morrow, 88 Ark. 583, 115 S. W. 173 (1909);
Zygmuntowica v. American Steel & Wire Co., 240 Mass. 421, 134 N. D. 385
(1922). Unless it Is otherwise provided by statute, as in Massachusetts.
Armstrong v. Stair, 217 Mass. 534, 105 N. H1.442 (1914).
However, as to the entrepreneur's liability when the act complained
of resulted from the negligence of the officer while acting as a passive
protector only the cases are in conflict. The instant decision, based upon
Redgate v. Southern Pacific Company, 24 Cal. App. 573, 141 Pac. 1191
(1914), is an expression of the minority view. The majority, on simple
agency principle (respondeat superior), find the entrepreneuer liable
even though the act resulting in the injury is a misjudged and wrongful act in excess of the employee's authority. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry.
Co. v. Harkett, 58 Ark. 381, 24 S. W. 881 (1894); Texas I. N. 0. R. Co. V.
Parsons, 102 Tex. 157, 113 S. W. 914 (1908); Rand v. Butte Electric R.
Co., 40 Mont. 398, 107 P. 87 (1910). Many of the courts, as the Mississippi court in King v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 69 Miss. 245, 10 So. 42 (1891),
state that each case must be determined on its own facts and lay down
no general rules. It is submitted, however, that these courts adopt the
majority's reasoning; at least this Is indicated by the opinions from
such jurisdictions.
The majority view of giving the police officer a dual personalityservant and public officer-admits of ready rationalization under the
ordinary conditions, for it is the state that prescribes regulations for
the officer actively warding off a trespass while it is the entrepreneur
who largely controls the passive officer.
W. M. L.

